The Wages of Sin: Social Norms and Executive Compensation

David A. Sauer, Gary P. Schneider, Aamer Sheikh

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper provides preliminary evidence on the effect of social norms on CEO pay. Using a sample of sin firms and non-sin firms for the years 1992-2010, we find that CEOs of sin firms earn higher pay than CEOs of non-sin firms. In addition, the bonus and cash pay-performance sensitivities of CEOs of sin firms are higher than the bonus and cash pay-performance sensitivities of CEOs of non-sin firms when performance is measured using accounting returns. These results add to the growing literature on the effect of social norms on financial markets.
Original languageAmerican English
JournalJournal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues
Volume16
StatePublished - Jan 1 2013

Disciplines

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Economics

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